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NOTES
IN RE KRAVITZ ESTATE: CONCLUSIVENESS OF A
PRIOR CONVICTION UNDER THE SLAYER'S ACT
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held in In re Kravitz
Estate' that the record of conviction and judgment of sentence of a
murderer was a conclusive bar to the convicted claimant's right
to take under or against the victim's will. The court further held
that a person convicted of murder could not have the question re-
litigated in the orphans' court. The Kravitz court based its holding
on the Slayer's Act of 1941,2 public policy and recent analogous
cases.
Ethel Kravitz was tried by a jury and convicted of the second
degree murder of her husband.4 The conviction and sentence were
affirmed on appeal.5 Decedent, Max Kravitz, left a will bequeathing
to his wife his residuary estate, provided she survived him by ninety
days. At audit 6 of the executor's account the accountant sought to
disqualify Ethel Kravitz as a legatee under decedent's will. The
accountant successfully introduced in evidence the criminal indict-
ment, docket entries, verdict of the jury and sentence of the crimi-
nal court.7 Counsel for Ethel Kravitz attempted to rebut the evi-
dence admitted by having claimant and additional witnesses testify
as to her innocence. The orphans' court judge refused the testimony
and held the criminal conviction incontrovertible as proof of claim-
ant's guilt. The lower court further ruled that the record of con-
viction8 of "wilful and unlawful killing"9 was a conclusive bar un-
1. 418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443 (1965). The court's decision leaves sev-
eral questions unanswered. Will the conviction of voluntary manslaughter
be conclusive? Will an acquittal of voluntary manslaughter, second degree
murder or first degree murder be held conclusive? What effect will a
habeas corpus proceeding have on the civil litigation?
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3441-3456 (1964).
3. Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965); Pennsylvania
Turnpike Comm'n v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d
423 (1963); Mineo v. Eureka Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 182 Pa. Super. 75, 125
A.2d 612 (1956).
4. Commonwealth v. Kravitz, No. 245, Pa. O.&T. of (Mongt.) June T.,
1958.
5. Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A.2d 861 (1960).
6. Kravitz Estate, 84 Montg. 255 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1964).
7. Id. at 257. The auditing judge refused to admit in evidence the
notes of testimony of the criminal trial, the exhibits, court's charge or the
opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in affirming the criminal
conviction.
8. As to the issue of what constitutes the "record of conviction" the
supreme court held:
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der the Slayer's Act of 1941 to Mrs. Kravitz' civil right to share in
the decedent's estate. This question being one of first impression in
Pennsylvania, the case was appealed and the orphans' court decision
was affirmed. Since there is no "express provision in the Act of
1941 covering the specific question," 10 this Note will test the Kravitz
court's construction of section 14 of the act against the history" of
related Pennsylvania cases and legislation, and against the interpre-
tation of similar statutes in other states.
STATUTES OF OTHER STATES
Statutes designed to prevent a slayer from acquiring property
from his victim's estate have been enacted in several states.12 The
status accorded evidence of prior criminal conviction varies from
conclusive to inadmissible. The statutes enacted in California, 3
Indiana 14 and West Virginia 15 make the criminal conviction incon-
trovertible. The California and Indiana statutes resolve the ques-
tion presented in the Kravitz case by express wording in the acts.
California's statute, which is the most complete on the question of
weight to be given a prior conviction or acquittal, provides:
No person who has unlawfully and intentionally caused the
death of decedent . ..shall be entitled to succeed to any
portion of the estate or to take under any will of the dece-
dent. . . . A conviction or acquittal on a charge of murder
or voluntary manslaughter shall be a conclusive determina-
tion of the unlawfulness or lawfulness of a causing of death,
for the purpose of this section.'6
The correct rule in these "slayer" cases is that the record of her
conviction includes the indictiment, the verdict of the jury, the
judgment and sentence of the Court, and any decision, order and
judgment of this Court and of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
418 Pa. at 328, 211 A.2d at 448.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3441 (1964).
10. 418 Pa. at 323, 211 A.2d at 445.
11. See generally van Roden, The Pennsylvania Slayers' Act, 22 PA.
B. A. Q. 48 (1950).
12. CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (Supp. 1965); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-
2-13 (1963); D. C. CODE ANN. § 18-109 (1961); FLA. STAT. § 731.31 (1964);
IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-212' (1953);- IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.535-37 (1964);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (.1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.87 (1947);
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-1.1-1-16 (Supp. 1964); S. D 'CODE §§ 0501-15
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109, 31-207 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-18
(Supp. 1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.010-.910 (1963); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 4095 (1961).
13. CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (Supp. 1965).
14. IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-212 (1953).
15. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4095 (1961). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934) (prior conviction conclusive
to bar slayer from acquiring insurance proceeds).
16. CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.) See
Whitfield v. Flaherty, 39 Cal. Rep. 857 (1964) (decided under a previous
act) (compares prior act with act as amended).
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Under this statute a criminal determination of guilt or innocence is
not a prerequisite to bar the slayer from participating in the victim's
estate; but a criminal determination of either guilty or innocence is
incontrovertible proof in a subsequent civil litigation involving the
slayer's right to participate in decedent's estate.
The Indiana statute'- requires a criminal conviction and makes
it conclusive on the issue. Case law 18 of Indiana, however, permits
the court of jurisdiction to determine the question of criminal hom-
icide if the criminal proceedings resulted in an acquittal 9 or sui-
cide prevented a criminal determination.
20
The statute enacted in Tennessee makes the conviction admis-
sible but not conclusive.21 Hill v. Alsobrook22 construed that stat-
ute to admit the prior conviction but the final determination of the
question of criminal homicide had to be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence in the civil litigation.23 In the Hill case, a wife,
convicted of voluntary manslaughter 24 in the death of her husband,
was permitted to participate in his estate. The trial court, after a
trial de novo, held she had acted in self-defense and was not a
slayer within the meaning of the act. The appellate court affirmed
the lower court.
25
The Iowa 26 and Minnesota 27 statutes do not designate whether
the conviction is admissible or what the probative weight should be
In the absence of an express provision in the Iowa statute, a prior
conviction has been held to be inadmissible except to show the re-
tention of the criminal proceeding. 28 In Minnesota the probate
court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the issue of disqualifi-
cation of an heir or legatee by felonious killing and the prior crimi-
nal conviction of homicide is given no weight in the probate court
proceeding.
2 9
17. IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-212 (1953) provides:
A person who shall have been legally convicted of intentionally
causing the death of another, or aiding or abetting therein, shall
... become a constructive trustee of any property . . . acquired
by him from the decedent .... Such conviction shall be final.
and conclusive in any subsdquent suit to charge him as such con-
structive trustee.
18. National City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, 237 Ind. 130, 144 N.E.
2d 710 (1957).
19. Id. at 142 n.15, 144 N.E.2d at. 715, n.15 (dictum).
20. Id. at 142, 144 N.E.2d at 715.
21. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109, 31-207 (1955).
22. 51 Tenn. App. 546, 370 S.W.2d 506 (1962).
23. Id. at 549, 370 S.W.2d at 508.
24. Conner v. Holbert, 49 Tenn. App. 319, 354 S.W.2d 809 (1961)
(held Tennessee statute included manslaughter).
25. 51 Tenn. App. 546, 370 S.W.2d 508 (1962).
26. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 633.535-37 (1964).
27. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.87 (1947).
28. In re Johnston's Estate, 220 Iowa 328, 262 N.W. 488 (1935).
29. Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 10, 53 N.W.2d 809 (1952).
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South Dakota,3 0 Washington 3 ' and Rhode Island32 have enacted
substantially the same statute as the Pennsylvania Slayer's Act of
1941. Unfortunately, there have been no cases decided in these
jurisdictions concerning the probative weight of a prior criminal
conviction. The Kravitz court's interpretation of the Pennsylvania
statute and the underlying reasoning may be beneficial to the
courts of these states if such a question arises.
The statutes discussed above, and the cases construing them,
are representative of the three basic views on the evidentiary status
of prior homicide convictions in estate distribution cases; i.e., con-
clusive, admissible but not conclusive, or inadmissible. If the stat-
ute does not expressly provide for the weight or admissibility of the
criminal conviction, the history of the act, the wrong intended to
be remedied and other related circumstances are considered to prop-
erly construe the statute.33
The Slayer's Act of 1941 does not contain explicit wording as
to the weight the record of prior conviction, though admissible, is
to be given.3 4 The Kravitz court could not look to other states'
statutes because the wording of these acts is significantly different.
The states3 5 having statutes similar to that of Pennsylvania have
not decided the issue involved in the Kravitz case. Thus, the
Kravitz court relied in part on the history of the Slayer's Act of
1941, in order to determine the intended construction. 36
HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SLAYER'S ACT OF 1941
The right of a slayer to participate in his victim's estate was
first litigated in Pennsylvania in Carpenter's Estate.3 T In that case
a son was tried, convicted and executed for having killed his father.
The collateral heirs attempted to disqualify the son's assignees on
the grounds of public policy that no person should be allowed to
benefit from his own wrong, a policy which had been otherwise
recognized in the administration of justice.38  The court, however,
held that in the absence of a legislative expression concerning for-
feiture in the effective intestate laws39 the son's assignees could
take the intestate share. The court was unwilling to adopt a policy
that was not expressed in the statute.
Slow to resolve the problem posed by Carpenter, the legislature
30. S.D. CODE §§ .0501-15 (1939).
31. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.010-.910 (1963).
32. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1-16 (Supp. 1964).
33. Statutory Construction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1952).
34. 418 Pa. 319, 323, 211 A.2d 443, 445 (1965).
35. See, statutes cited note 12 supra.
36. 418 Pa. 319, 323, 211 A.2d 443, 445 (1965).
37. 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895).
38. See e.g., New York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S.
591 (1895); Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, [1892] 1 Q.B. 147.
39. PA. LAWS 1833, act 315 (repealed)
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subsequently enacted the "original" Slayer's Act 40 in 1917. The act
provided that any person who was "finally adjudged guilty, ei-
ther as a principal or accessory, of murder of the first or second
degree"'4 1 was barred from participating in the victim's estate. It
seems from the strong language of the statute that the conviction
would have been a conclusive bar,42 at least under the Carpenter
facts. No cases were decided to affirm this contention. The strict
requirement of a criminal conviction was shown in Tarlo's Estate
4
to be inadequate. A father committed suicide after killing his wife
and daughter. The court strictly construed the Act of 1917 and held
the words "finally adjudged guilty" to mean a criminal conviction.
The father's administrators were awarded the estate because the
suicide prevented a criminal conviction. Justice Drew, concurring
in Tarlow, appealed to the legislature to "change the law that, on
the facts such as those which have caused our division, the question
of guilt will be submitted to and determined by a jury."
'44
The inadequacies of the Act of 191745 were remedied by the
comprehensive Slayer's Act of 1941. The act was proposed by Pro-
fessor John W. Wade.46 The term "slayer" is defined in the act as
"any person who participates, either as a principal or as an acces-
sory before the fact, in the wilful and unlawful killing of any other
person. ' 4 7 This definition permits the orphans' court to determine
if the claimant is a slayer, or claims under one who was a slayer in
fact. The circumstance of suicide or insanity does not now prevent
the court from determining if any person is or was a "slayer" within
the meaning of the act.48 A criminal conviction is no longer pre-
requisite to barring a slayer or his assigns from taking property of
decedent's estate.
In the event of a criminal conviction for the "wilful and unlaw-
ful killing" of a person claiming property in decedent's estate, sec-
tion 14 provides: "The record of his conviction of having partici-
pated in the wilful and unlawful killing of the decedent shall be
admissible in evidence against a claimant of property in any civil
40. PA. LAWS 1917, act 403, § 22 (repealed).
41. PA. LAW: 1917, act 403, § 22 (repealed).
42. BREGY, PENNSYLVANIA INTERSTATE WILLS AND ESTATES ACT OF 1947
753 (1949).
43. 315 Pa. 321, 172 Atl. 139 (1934).
44. Id. at 327, 172 Atl. at 141 (concurring opinion).
45. Other inadequacies of the Act of 1917 were: 1) failed to designate
how the estate was to pass if the slayer was disqualified and 2) made no
provisions for out-of-state criminal convictions for homicide.
46. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilful Killing-A Statutory So-
lution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936) (substantially the statute enacted in
Pennsylvania) (contains section by section commentaries).
48. See Estate of Sanders, 39 Wash. 196 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1959) (sui-
cide); D'Amore Estate, 37 Del. 360 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1950) (dictum); Sobel
v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Erie, 33 Erie 274 (Pa. C.P. 1950) (insanity);
BREGY, op. cit. supra note 42, at 753; Wade, supra note 46, at 722-24. But
see Paul's Estate, 28 Pa. D.&C.2d 658 (Orphans' Ct. 1962) (by implication).
NOTES
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action arising under this act. '49 The broad purpose of this act is
enunciated in section 2: "No slayer shall in any way acquire prop-
erty or receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent,
but such property shall pass as provided in the sections follow-
ing."50 The public policy of the Slayer's Act is found in section 15:
"This act shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be con-
strued broadly in order to effect the policy of this State that no
person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever com-
mitted." 51
Prior to Kravitz the commentators 52 and the orphans' courts of
Pennsylvania considered criminal conviction for "wilful and unlaw-
ful killing" as prima facie evidence that the claimant was a slayer,
rebuttable by competent evidence. This was the position taken in
Pinder's Estate. 3 In that case the court held a criminal convic-
tion for voluntary manslaughter admissible as prima facie evidence.
The Pinder court reasoned that the prior conviction could not be
res judicata or conclusive because of the lack of identity of parties
in the actions. The criminal action was between the claimant and
the Commonwealth and the civil action is between the heirs and the
claimant. 4 The court further said:
[S] ection 14 of the Act of 1941 (20 P.S. §3454) provides that
such record of conviction is-'admissible in evidence against
a claimant of property in any civil suit,' but this does not
make the conviction a conclusive bar to civil right. The rec-
ord of conviction is therefore to be considered as prima
facie evidence in this proceeding that the homicide was 'wil-
ful and unlawful,' which may be rebutted by competent
and satisfactory evidence to the contrary.55
The orphans' court inquired into the facts, heard testimony, found
that petitioner acted in self-defense, and held her not a "slayer"
within the definition of the act.
Another case following this reasoning is D'Amore Estate,56
which concerned the admissibility of a prior acquittal. The court
said:
[T] he law of Pennsylvania at present and at the time of de-
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3454 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3442 (1964).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3455 (1964). Use of the phrase "where-
ever committed" apparently means that out-of-state convictions would be
valid for the purpose of this act.
52. BREGY, op. cit. supra note 42, at 753; van Roden, supra, note 11, at
61; Note, 17 U. PITT. L. REV. 494, 498 (1956); Note, DICK L. REV. 99, 101
(1942).
53. 61 Pa. D.&C. 193 (Orphans' Ct. 1947).
54. Id. at 195. It can be argued that the right to inherit is a statutory
right and that the Commonwealth has an active and substantial interest in
the distributive determination in cases involving the Slayer's Act. It is
conceivable that the Commonwealth has a substantial interest comparable
with that of the heirs.
55. Id. at 195-96.
56. 37 Del. 360 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1950).
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cedent's death is that the mere result of a trial for criminal
homicide is not the controlling factor determining the right
of a person to inherit or benefit in the estate of the dece-
dent. Thus, depending upon the evidence adduced the
court may find the parties are entitled to inherit and to
benefit in the decedent's estate, even though found guilty
of criminal homicide.5
This construction is further supported by Professor Wade's com-
ments concerning section 14. The comment states that without this
section most jurisdictions would hold the criminal conviction inad-
missible in a civil trial. Professor Wade also recognized that some
legislatures "may even wish to make a conviction conclusive evi-
dence of the guilt of the alleged slayer. '5 8 This statement necessar-
ily implies that the language of section 14 would have to be altered
to make the evidence conclusive. As the section was enacted, the
author only intended the conviction to be admissible and was silent
as to the weight it should be given.
The Kravitz court, however, had "no doubt of the legislative
intent and of the proper construction of the Act." 59 This proposi-
tion is supported neither by the history of the legislation nor by a
careful examination of the act. The silence of section 14 as to the
weight of a prior conviction must be construed in terms of the Act
of 1917. Under the Act of 1917 a criminal conviction of first or
second degree murder would have been conclusive. 0 The legisla-
ture's action changed the wording of the Slayer's Act of 1941 to
"admissible in evidence." This change in wording in the Slayer's
Act of 1941 indicates that a change in construction was intended.6 '
The Pennsylvania common law rule in 1941 made a criminal
conviction inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent civil litigation
based on the same facts or issue.62 There were only two jurisdic-
tions that applied a contrary rule. 3 Section 14 providing the con-
viction "shall be admissible in evidence," abrogated the common law
rule which prevailed at the time of the enactment. The wording of
the section was deliberately designed to accomplish that result.
57. Id. at 361 (dictum). Accord, All States Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 96
Pitts. 193 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1948).
58. Wade, supra, note 46, at 750.
59. 418 Pa. at 328, 211 A.2d at 448.
60. BREGY, op. cit. supra, note 42, at 753.
61. Cf. Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 291 (1894) (dissenting opin-
ion); Panil v. Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 490, 88 A.2d 730, 731 (1952); Fidelity Trust
Co. v. Kirk, 344 Pa. 455, 458, 25 A.2d 825, 827 (1942); Vince V. Allegheny-
Pittsburgh Coal Co., 153 Pa. Super. 333, 33 A.2d 788 (1943).
62. Wingrove v. Central Pa. Tractor Co., 327 Pa. 549, 85 Atl. 850
(1912); Bennett v. Fulmer, 49 Pa. 155 (1865); Bobereski v. Insurance Co.
of. Pa., 105 Pa. Super. 585, 161 Atl. 412 (1932); Estate of Gartner, 94 Pa.
Super. 45 (1928).
63. Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932)
(prior conviction admissible'as prima facie evidence); Eagle, Star & British




If the legislative intent is determined as of the time of the enact-
ment,64 there are no circumstances indicating an intent to make the
conviction a conclusive bar to the claimant's civil rights.
The Kravitz court may have done substantial violence to the
legislative intent. The question of the weight to be given the con-
viction did not escape the consideration of the legislature. The pos-
sibility of making the conviction conclusive was expressed in the
commentary on section 14 by the author of the proposed statute.6 5
The Act of 1917 involved the question of conclusiveness. Yet the
Kravitz court seized upon the silence of the Slayer's Act of 1941
on the question as an opportunity to legislate under the guise of
interpretation.
The better reasoned view would seem to be that the legislature
considered the question of probative weight but intentionally omit-
ted an explicit statement. Careful examination of the wording of
section 14 suggests that the legislature did give an indication as to
the weight of the conviction. The legislature could have abrogated
the common law rule of inadmissibility by using the words "shall
be admissible." The words employed in section 14 are "shall be
admissible in evidence." The use of the words "in evidence" re-
flects an intent for a justicable determination of the issue.66 "Evi-
dence" is that matter which is introduced for the purpose of in-
ducing belief in the trier of factf 7 In section 14 the legislature
was probably using "evidence" as an aggregated concept; i.e., the
total of all matter introduced to support a contention. Thus, to
admit the conviction "in evidence" would seem to mean that it was
to be an element of the evidence and not the singular controlling
factor. The probative weight of the conviction could then be deter-
mined by the trier of fact in light of the evidence presented by the
claimant convict.
The Kravitz opinion displays considerable regard for the pur-
pose and policy of the act to insure that the slayer will not "ac-
quire any property or receive any benefit as a result"6 of the killing
and "that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong."6' 9
The court apparently assumes that making criminal conviction a
conclusive bar to a claimant's right to participate in the decedent's
estate is necessary to effectuate this purpose and policy; but, it
does not express a rationale to support this assumption. While
holding the prior conviction as conclusive is one means to give effect
to the policy and purpose, it is not the exclusive means. The or-
64. Cf. St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Potter Township, 398 Pa. 361, 157 A.2d
638 (1960).
65. Wade, supra note 46, at 750.
66. Brief for Appellant, p. 3, In re Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211
A.2d 443 (1965).
67. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3443 (1964).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3455 (1964).
[Vol. 70
Winter 1966]
phans' court could hear rebuttal evidence and determine the slay-
er's civil rights based on all the evidence presented. The same pol-
icy and purpose govern those cases in which the estate asserts that
a person is a slayer, but there has been no prior conviction.
The jurisdiction of the orphans' court, derived solely by stat-
ute, 70 is exclusive in determining all questions concerning the dis-
tribution of decedents' estates.7 ' The court also has "all legal and
equitable powers required for or incidental to the exercise of its
jurisdiction. ' 72 Any act that has the effect of limiting its jurisdic-
tion must be construed strictly.7 3  It could be argued that the
Kravitz court's holding of the criminal conviction as a "conclusive
bar to [Ethel Kravitz'] rights to take under or against her husband's
will" 74 gave the court of oyer and terminer the power to determine
a right that was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the orphans'
court.7 5 The legatee's right to acquire property from decedent's
estate was determined when the jury announced its verdict in the
criminal prosecution. Section 15 of the Slayer's Act provides that
the act should be "construed broadly," but not so broadly as to
limit the power or jurisdiction of the orphans' court, the court of
final determination of claimants' right to participate in decedents'
estates.
RECENT ANALOGOUS CASES
What prompted the supreme court to construe the wording of
section 14 to the effect "that a conviction of wilful and unlawful
killing shall be a conclusive bar to the claimant's right to partici-
pate in decedent's estate?" Apparently, the reason for the court's
decision is that holding the prior conviction conclusive represents
the most practical and direct method to prevent a convicted slayer
from becoming a beneficiary of his own wrong.
The Kravitz court does not discuss the practical aspects in its
decision. Analogous cases 76 are advanced to demonstrate the prac-
ticality of making the prior conviction conclusive in the absence of
a statute and the similarity of policy consideration under the Slay-
70. Orphans' Court Act of 1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 2080.101-773
(1964).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2080.301(1) (1964).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2080.304 (1964).
73.- Statutory Construction Act, Pa. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1952) pro-
vides:. "All provisions of a law of the classes hereafter enumerated shall
be strictly construed . . . [p]rovisions decreasing the jurisdiction of a court
of record."
74. 418 Pa. at 329, 211 A.2d at 448.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2080.301(1) (1964).
76. Justice Cohen, joined by Justice Musmanno, in dissent, argued:
Stirone . . . is not applicable here. In this case we are not deal-
ing with Pennsylvania's common law rules of evidence but, in-
stead, with a statutory provision which regulates use of certain
specified items of evidence in a proceeding to determine the right
of inheritance-a subject entirely regulated by statute.
418 Pa. at 330, 211 A.2d at 449 (dissenting opinion).
NOTES
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er's Act of 1941 and these common law decisions. The earliest de-
cided case was Greifer's Estate77 in which a wife, who was convicted
of the first degree murder of her husband, sought to recover the
proceeds of a trust created by him as the designated beneficiary.
The corpus of the trust was an insurance policy on the husband's
life. There was no mention of the probative weight of her prior
conviction. The court disallowed her claim on the "common law
principle that a person will not be permitted to profit by his own
wrong, particularly by his own crime.178 The Greifer court was
unwilling to provide a forum where a wrongdoer could bring an
action to derive benefit from the criminal act.
This strong policy consideration was coupled with the conclu-
siveness of a criminal conviction in Mineo v. Eureka Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. 79 There, the owners of a restaurant were convicted of
arson.8 0 Prior to setting the fire, the owners purchased substantial
fire insurance on the restaurant. Before the criminal prosecution
for arson, they assigned the insurance policies to Mineo. Mineo, as
assignee of the insurance policies, attempted to recover the proceeds.
At the civil trial the criminal convictions of the assignors were ad-
mitted as evidence. Additional evidence was introduced to prove
the guilt of the insureds. The trial judge charged the jury that the
right of Mineo to recover the proceeds of the insurance policies
rested on their determination of whether the insureds had crimi-
nally caused the fire.8' The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
claimant Mineo; the insurance companies appealed and the superior
court reversed. The court, holding the criminal convictions of the
insureds as a conclusive bar to the assignee's claim, stated:
This rule is founded upon the public interest which re-
quires that the law against a crime be enforced, and that
courts aid no man in any effort he may make to benefit from
his violation of them. The rule is enforced upon the
grounds of public policy alone.
To now permit them to recover for the loss which they
have been convicted of fraudulently causing would be
against public policy. It would tend to destroy the confi-
dence of the public in the efficiency of the courts; it would
stir up litigation that would reopen tried issues; it would
impress the public with the belief that the results of trials
of the gravest nature were so uncertain that the innocent
could not escape condemnation; and it would convince the
public that the courts themselves have no confidence in
the judicial processes.
82
77. 333 Pa. 278, 5 A.2d 118 (1939) (decided prior to the enactment
of the Slayer's Act of 1941).
78. Id., at 279, 5 A.2d at 118.
79. 182 Pa. Super. 75, 125 A.2d.612 (1956).
80. Conviction was confirmed in Commonwealth v. Tomaino, 168 Pa.
Super. 505, 79 A.2d 274 (1951).
81. 182 Pa. Super. 75, 77, 125 A.2d 612, 615 (1956).
82. Id. at 84-86, 125 A.2d at 617-18.
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The policy consideration employed in Greifer and Mineo is the
same as underlies the Slayer's Act of 1941. Neither court permitted
a wrongdoer to profit from his criminal act. In Greifer the court
barred the wife's claim without discussing the method utilized,
whereas, the Mineo court was faced with a jury verdict contrary to
the policy consideration. Since the jury had properly considered
the conviction as prima facie evidence, but had decided for the ar-
sonists' assignee, the court had to either allow the recovery, even
though against public policy, or bar the claim as a matter of law.
In holding the assignors' criminal convictions as conclusive in the
civil trial, the court realized that it was contrary to the law in
Pennsylvania and the vast majority of jurisdictions.8 3 It considered
the public policy tantamount to "some technical rule of evidence. '8 4
The Mineo position was followed in Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.85 and Hurtt v. Stirone.8 6
The Pennsylvania Turnpike decision, following the reasoning of
Mineo in part, held a surety liable for his principal's breach of the
conditions of fidelity bonds. The principal's conviction of con-
spiracy to defraud and misbehavior in office87 was held in the
lower court to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the breach.
The Commission moved for judgment on the pleadings which was
denied because the principal's prior conviction was not, in the lower
court's opinion, conclusive on the issue. The Commission contended
on appeal that under the policy consideration of Mineo and the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel or res judicata s8 the principal's prior
conviction was incontrovertible proof of the breach of the fidelity
bonds.89 The Pennsylvania Turnpike court considered the Mineo
rationale persuasive, but did not base its holding solely on that
83. Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. Gunn, 27 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491 (1933);
Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936); Zubrod v.
Kuhn, 357 Pa. 200, 53 A.2d 604 (1947); Nowak v. Orange, 349 Pa. 217, 36
A.2d 781 (1944); Seidman v. Seidman, 53 R.1. 96, 164 AtI. 194 (1933). See
2 FREEDMAN, JUDGMENTS § 653 (5th ed. 1925); Note, 40 HARV. L. REV. 909
(1927).
84. 182 Pa. Super. at 85, 125 A.2d at 618.
85. 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d 423 (1963).
86. 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965).
87. Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Super. 179, 154 A.2d 57 (1959),
aff'd, 399 Pa. 387, 160 A.2d 407 (1960) (per curiam).
88. The doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel has been de-
scribed as follows:
A question of fact or of law distinctly put in issue and directly
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of
recovery or defense in a suit or action between parties sui juris
is conclusively settled by the final judgment or decree therein so
that it cannot be further litigated in a subsequent suit between
the same parties or their privies whether the second suit be for
the same or a different cause of action.
Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 85 (1921). (Emphasis added.) See also
Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 389 Pa. 21, 131 A.2d 622 (1957).
89. Brief for Appellant, p.6, Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d 423 (1963).
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ground. Rather, the court applied the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel to hold the prior conviction of the principal conclusive on the
surety's liability, reasoning that there was substantial identity of
parties in the criminal action and in the civil action. The criminal
prosecution involved the principal as the defendant, and the Com-
monwealth as the prosecutor. The civil action was between the
Turnpike Commission, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, 90
and the surety, which is bound by the determination of the prin-
cipal's breach.' Thus, the question of fact of the principal's breach
was determined in the criminal action and the surety, as a legal
consequence of the suretyship, was conclusively bound by that de-
termination.
In the absence of identity of parties the Stirone court used the
strong public policy to set forth the law of the state in regard to
the admissibility and probative weight of prior conviction in civil
litigations. Stirone was convicted of extortion 92 under a federal
statute.9 3 Hurtt, trustee of the victim, sought recovery in a civil
action. The Stirone court held the criminal conviction was conclu-
sive on the question of extortion, relying on the policy consideration
set forth in Mineo. The opinion stated, "when one has been con-
victed of felony, the result of which is of financial benefit to him the
record of his guilt should bar his avoidance of restitution there-
for." 4 The court considered the public policy more persuasive than
the "technical doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel re-
garding identity of parties."
95
The rule of conclusiveness established in Stirone is not an ab-
solute rule, but should be applied "where reason and logic so de-
mand.19 6 In these cases "reason and logic" dictated that the con-
viction be conclusive on the issue determined in the criminal court.
In Mineo, Pennsylvania Turnpike and Stirone each defendant was
indicted and tried for a serious crime, punishable by imprisonment,
fine or both. Each had a fair and impartial trial with sufficient
opportunity to present the best available defense and to prove his
innocence. Moreover, the burden of proof of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" necessarily sustained by the prosecution in each of the crimi-
90. Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d
199 (1962). See also Eidenmiller, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 408 Pa. 195, 182
A.2d 911 (1962).
91. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 340 Pa. 468, 17 A.2d 352 (1941);
Commonwealth v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 224 Pa. 95, 73 Atl. 327
(1909).
92. Stirone was twice convicted. First conviction, United States v.
Stirone, 168 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1957), afj'd, 262 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1958),
rev'd, 361 U.S. 212 (1960). Second conviction, United States v. Stirone, 311
F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
93. Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1952).
94. 416 Pa. at 498, 206 A.2d at 626.
95. Ibid. Cf. Bonfitto v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 406 Pa. 184, 177
A.2d 453 (1962).
96. Id. at 497, 206 A.2d at 625.
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nal actions is theoretically greater than the "preponderance of the
evidence" burden required in civil litigations. No reason exists to
permit such defendants to avoid restitution or to benefit from
wrongful acts by attempting to dispute facts or contest issues previ-
ously determined in criminal actions under a greater burden of
proof.
It should be noted that the civil litigations of Mineo, Pennsyl-
vania Turnpike and Stirone turned on the decisive fact determined
in the criminal prosecutions. Civil litigation, however, cannot al-
ways be controlled by the fact of criminal conviction arising out of
the same set of circumstances. For example, "reason and logic"
would not dictate that a person found guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter would be conclusively liable for wrongful death based on
negligence. The defense of contributory negligence would not be
available in the criminal prosecution, but it may allow the person
convicted to escape civil liability. Likewise, convictions of minor
violations, such as misdemeanors or traffic violations, would not be
conclusive. In these cases "expediency and convenience, rather
than guilt, often control the defendant's trial technique." 97
The Stirone case established a practical and logical rule based
on public policy, to govern the effect of a criminal conviction upon
related civil litigation. It creates consistency in the administration
of justice and eliminates time consuming and unnecessary procedure
in relitigating judicially determined issues. Finally, it gives full
effect to the public policy that the court shall aid no man to bene-
fit from his wrongdoing.
In the absence of the Slayer's Act of 1941 the facts of the
Kravitz case would come under the rule established in Stirone.
The second degree murder committed by Mrs. Kravitz was a serious
crime and a presumption that the best available defense was pre-
sented would be justified; the criminal conviction of claimant
established "beyond reasonable doubt" the fact of a "wilful and
unlawful killing '"s and that claimant "participated . . . as a princi-
pal" 99 in such a killing; and, the civil action by the claimant was
for the purpose of profiting from her crime. Thus, the instant case
has all the necessary elements to hold the prior conviction conclu-
sive in civil litigation under the rationale of Mineo and Stirone.
CONCLUSION
The Kravitz court was faced with the alternatives of construing
the act as it probably was intended, that is, to make the record of
conviction admissible but not conclusive, or, to legislate and hold
the conviction conclusive as it would be under present decisional
law. By adopting the latter alternative the court arrived at the most
97. Id. at 499, 206 A.2d at 627.
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3441(1) (1964).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3441(1) (1964).
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reasonable solution and gave maximum effect to the purpose and
policy of the act. Any license taken with the legislative intent is
nominal and all that was clearly intended can still be accomplished.
In the event of suicide or insanity 00 the orphans' court can deter-
mine if the deceased or insane is the "slayer" within the meaning
of the act. If an heir or the estate asserts that a claimant is a
"slayer" the orphans' court may determine the issue.0 1
In holding the conviction incontrovertible the court provided a
practical method whereby an executor or administrator of an estate
can disqualify a convicted slayer without incurring the expense of
proving the fact. To allow a convicted slayer to present rebuttal
evidence would force an estate to pay additional attorney fees, pro-
vide necessary witnesses, absorb required filing costs, and possibly
participate in lengthy appeals.10 2 Such expenses could significantly
and unreasonably reduce if not entirely consume the amount dis-
tributable to more deserving heirs or legatees.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision demonstrates that
practicality is sometimes more desirable than technicality in the
administration of justice. On the strength of a strong public policy
the court construed section 14 of the Slayer's Act to best promote
justice. The decision is designed to further, not frustrate, the fact
finding function of the orphans' court in the distribution of dece-
dents' estates involving convicted slayers.
JERRY R. DUFFIE
100. See Estate of Sanders, 39 Wash. 196 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1959)
(suicide); Sobel v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Erie, 33 Erie 274 (Pa. C.P.
1950) (insanity).
101. But see Blakely Estate, 28 Pa. D.&C.2d 648 (Orphans' Ct. 1962)
(distribution postponed until completion of district attorney's investiga-
tion).
102. In the criminal prosecution of Mrs. Kravitz there was over 1500
pages of testimony. Counsel for the accused filed sixty-eight exceptions
to support the motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. Over
eighty pages of judicial opinion has been written concerning the criminal
prosecution. To relitigate the question of the claimant's guilt could be
equally as long and as expensive.
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